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expansion of the "self." Just that is its function. That is what Santayana calls egotism. The Germans call it romanticism. A better indictment would be romantic criminology.

For democracy "synthesis" means compromise, a willingness to recognize the claims of others, and the exercise of intelligence as a means of adjustment. Not rigidity, sacrifice and absolutism; but flexibility, tolerance, cooperation and compromise are the ideals for an American democracy.

M. T. MCCLURE.

TULANE UNIVERSITY.

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### ON RELIGIOUS VALUES; A REJOINDER

**I**N an article in this JOURNAL<sup>1</sup> I have pointed out two fallacies that are met with frequently in works in the philosophy of religion, fallacies that I have called the "pragmatic fallacy" and the "fallacy of false attribution." Professor Brightman<sup>2</sup> and Professor Moore<sup>3</sup> have presented criticisms of my views. In answering these criticisms I shall be led into a somewhat detailed discussion of religious values from the point of view of a behaviorist. The views of one who speaks of the meaning and value of God in human behavior are apt to be misunderstood, since religion is a field into which behaviorism has not as yet ventured far. However, since this is a direction in which study will prove fruitful, I shall offer a classification of religious values, which will make clearer what would be an objective, behavioristic account of religious values, and which will also be a part of my answer to my critics.

#### I

The pragmatic fallacy in the philosophy of religion, as I have defined it, consists of the identification of the value with the truth of religious beliefs, and of the acceptance of those religious beliefs as true which are found to have value. I have insisted that the concepts of truth and of value can not be identified. I have pointed out especially that the survival-value of religious beliefs in human evolution is no evidence of the truth of the beliefs, contrary to the view of James, who was the first to employ Darwinism in defense of religious truth. Further discussion of the meaning of value is obviously needed, but I presupposed among the readers of my article a sufficient familiarity with the developments in the theory of value

<sup>1</sup> *Two Common Fallacies in the Logic of Religion*, this JOURNAL, Vol. XIV., pp. 653-660.

<sup>2</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XV., pp. 71-76.

<sup>3</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XV., pp. 76-78.

from the work of Meinong<sup>4</sup> and of Ehrenfels<sup>5</sup> to recent discussions in this JOURNAL to obviate such misinterpretations as have been laid on my statements by Professor Brightman.

Though the pragmatic fallacy may be maintained equally well in connection with other theories of value, the theory which I accept, as I suggested in my original article, is one which defines value in terms of organic attitudes and acts, in terms of liking and desiring; and liking and desiring may be most adequately treated in behavioristic terms. An object possesses value if some organism has an interest in it; and to have an interest in an object means to act in such a way as to try to get possession of it (or retain it if already possessed), or at least to enjoy it, as in the case of esthetic values. Since interests and likes and dislikes have meaning only in terms of behavior, value may ultimately be defined in terms of reactions or responses, positive or negative. Positive response constitutes positive value (the good, the desirable, *etc.*), and negative response constitutes negative value (the bad, the undesirable, *etc.*).

But value is not so simple and obvious a thing as such a definition might seem to imply. There are various types and classes of values, all coming within this one definition. I might have presupposed that my readers would be familiar with the common distinction between independent, or immediate, values, attaching to objects valued for their own sake, as ends, and dependent, or instrumental, or derived, values, attaching to objects only when such objects are instrumental to other objects possessing independent values. Instrumental values are "derived" from the relation of the objects to other objects directly valued. An instrumental value is thus only indirectly the object of interest. Though I might have presupposed familiarity with such a distinction between independent and dependent values, I was careful to state<sup>6</sup> that biological utility is a case of what I have here called instrumental value, not independent, since an object that possesses biological utility, *i. e.*, one that is instrumental to the preservation of life, "is indirectly the object of interest or desire, since life is valued with approximate universality." But Professor Brightman overlooked my statement of this distinction, and tries to make out that I have presented two definitions of value, a psychological and a biological one.<sup>7</sup> My single definition is, rather, a psycho-biological one, and allows for the distinction between independent and dependent values. The classifi-

<sup>4</sup> A. Meinong, *Psychologisch-Ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie*, Graz, 1894.

<sup>5</sup> C. von Ehrenfels, *System der Werttheorie*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1897.

<sup>6</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 654, note 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 72.

cation which I shall present a little later will make my position clearer.

Professor Brightman makes two confusions of the issue when he refers to my distinction between what I called "scientific" and "metaphysical" beliefs. I said that "scientific" beliefs, referring to details of the physical environment and capable of empirical verification, must be true in order to be valuable. I cited the case of belief in the safety of the ice as an example. Professor Brightman,<sup>8</sup> in the first place, confuses the belief in the safety of the ice (the belief is a psychological entity—ultimately a behavioristic fact) and the ice itself. I spoke, not about the value of the ice, as Professor Brightman tries to make out, but only about the value of the *belief* in the safety of the ice. Whether or not the small boy likes the ice itself is an extraneous matter. In the second place, as I pointed out, it is the indirect or instrumental value of the belief (its instrumentality in relation to survival, survival being directly desired) that is in question, not its independent value as the direct object of desire, as Professor Brightman seems to think.<sup>9</sup> So whether or not the small boy likes to *believe* in the safety of the ice is also an extraneous matter. The actual instrumentality of the belief is the important thing.

As a result of these two confusions, Professor Brightman's criticism of my statement of the pragmatic fallacy falls down. When he concludes that he has reduced my pragmatic fallacy to "the argument that a belief is true because we desire it to be true,"<sup>10</sup> he shows his entire failure to take into account the distinction between independent and dependent values. The chief error of some pragmatists when dealing with the philosophy of religion, and of James especially, has been in maintaining that religious beliefs possessing survival-value thereby demonstrate their truth. Such beliefs may or may not be true. Nothing can be inferred from their survival-value as to their truth. To maintain that survival-value of religious beliefs is evidence of their truth is to commit the pragmatic fallacy.

Professor Moore objects to my distinction between "metaphysical" and "scientific" beliefs. He says<sup>11</sup> that even false "scientific" beliefs may be "subjectively" valuable, as in the case of belief in the non-existence of pain, while being "objectively" harmful through hindering the cure of the disease. This is all very true, and does nothing to invalidate the distinction that I made. It helps to confirm it instead. The fact is, as Professor Moore points out in

<sup>8</sup> See *loc. cit.*, pp. 71, 72.

<sup>9</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 72.

<sup>10</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 72.

<sup>11</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 77.

this example, that "scientific" beliefs do have "objective" effects, and hence must be true if they are to possess a balance of positive value. "Metaphysical" beliefs, on the other hand, as I defined them, can not have "objective" effects to counterbalance any "subjective" effects of positive value that they may have. Professor Moore does not deny this, but simply claims that they may have harmful effects on "the spiritual nature." This is beside the point when the case is being argued on the biological grounds of pragmatism, for "the spiritual nature," in Professor Moore's sense of the term, does not count as a factor of biological significance in the struggle for existence.

It is necessary to make the distinction that I did between "scientific" and "metaphysical" beliefs or else, from the premises of the instrumentalist, it would follow that all beliefs that survive would be true, and survival would be the test of truth. Professor Moore would not grant that this is the case any more than I do. I pointed out that some beliefs, which I called "metaphysical," in that they do not refer to the physical environment, may possess a "subjective" value even if not objectively true, and may prevail and survive because of this "subjective"<sup>12</sup> value.

## II

Having defined value in its generic sense in terms of interest or desire, it remains for us to differentiate religious values from other values, such as ethical, economic, and esthetic values, and then to classify the religious values. Religious values may be differentiated from the values dealt with by the other value sciences by reference to the objects to which they are said to attach, *i. e.*, to the supernatural objects of belief, to the acts of worship that such belief leads to, and especially to the beliefs themselves, regarded as psychological objects.

The distinction between immediate and instrumental values, and that between real and ideal values, are the chief ones to be pointed out in a classification of religious values. Immediate and instrumental values have already been defined. Ideal values are those which we predicate of objects that are not real, but depend for their existence on the valuing subject being "invoked by an interest and held in existence only by the act of imagination."<sup>13</sup> Real value-objects, on the other hand, are objects that exist independently of

<sup>12</sup> I enclose the terms "subjective" and "objective" in quotation marks to indicate that I use them in a special sense. For behaviorism the term "subjective" lacks its usual connotation.

<sup>13</sup> R. B. Perry, *Religious Values*, *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. XIX. (1915), p. 3.

the interested subject. They are facts, while ideal value-objects are fancies.

My classification of religious values, which follows, is in general agreement with one already made by Professor Perry,<sup>14</sup> but I have made several added distinctions to allow for cases of value that could not otherwise be provided for.

Instrumental values are of importance in the study of value, especially in the case of religious values. There are several distinguishable sorts of instrumental values. The mere causal connection between two objects, one of which is directly valued, is one case. I refer by this to the relation of *A* to *B* when *A* is the condition of *B*'s occurrence or existence. A second case is that involving the judgment that *A* is the condition of *B*, when the judgment is true. A third case is that in which there occurs the judgment that *A* is the condition of *B*, when the judgment is false, though *A* is real. A fourth case involves the judgment that *A* is the condition of *B* when *A* is unreal, though believed real, but such that the judgment would be true if *A* existed. A fifth case is that involving the judgment that *A* is the condition of *B* when *A* is unreal, and when the judgment would be false even if *A* existed.

In these five cases we find, first, the distinction between actual causal connection and the judgment of, or belief in, such connection; second, the distinction between true and false judgments of causal connection when truth and falsity depend upon the reality or unreality of the causal connection; and third, the distinction between true and false judgments of causal connection when truth and falsity depend upon the existence or non-existence of *A*. A combination of the second and third cases occurs when *A* is valued because judged instrumental to *B*, and when, as a matter of fact, *A* is unreal, and when the relation of instrumentality could not hold even if *A* existed.

The mere relation of causality or instrumentality in itself does not constitute value;<sup>15</sup> but we may say that an object has value if it is actually instrumental to a *valued* object, even though the instrumentality is not recognized. If *A* is actually instrumental to *B*, and if *B* is the object of desire, then it is permissible to say that *A* has *conditional* instrumental value. The biological value of many religious beliefs is of this sort. In such a case the object *A* is not the object of an actual interest, but it would be desired if its instrumentality to *B*, which is desired, were recognized.

All of the above distinctions are provided for in the three following tables:

<sup>14</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 1 seq.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. W. T. Bush, *Value and Causality*, this JOURNAL, Vol. XV., pp. 85-96.

**I. REAL VALUES** (attaching to objects that exist).

1. Immediate, or independent (attaching to objects valued directly).
2. Instrumental, or dependent.
  - A. Conditional (when real instrumentality exists, but is not recognized).
  - B. Actual (when instrumentality is recognized).
    - a. True (when valuing of object is mediated by a true judgment of instrumentality).
    - b. False (when meditated by a false judgment).

What I call "conditional instrumental values" are in all cases *actually instrumental*, by definition. They are not *actual values*, however, because not valued in the absence of a judgment of instrumentality, which is required to convert a mere disposition into an actual valuing act. What I call "actual instrumental values" may not be *actually instrumental* in all cases; but if judged to be instrumental, whether truly or falsely, they then have *actual value* because actually desired.

A second table of ideal values, would be as follows:

**II. IDEAL VALUES** (attaching to objects that are not real).

1. Immediate, or independent.
2. Instrumental, or dependent.
  - A. Conditional (lacking, for what does not exist can not be the cause of anything).
  - B. Actual.
    - a. True (lacking, for there can be no true judgment of instrumentality when the instrument does not exist).
    - b. False (the only case of instrumental ideal values).

In the case of a false, actual, instrumental, ideal value, the object is actually valuable because it is (1) believed real (falsely), (2) judged instrumental (falsely), and (3) actually valued because so judged.

A third table, of the *real values of belief*, is necessary. For behaviorism belief is a positive reaction to a proposition, and disbelief is a negative reaction. Belief in God, for example, is an acceptance of, or a positive organic attitude towards, the proposition, God exists. Disbelief is a rejection of, or a negative attitude towards, the proposition. Beliefs are psychological, *i. e.*, behavioristic, entities, and propositions are not. Strictly, when such a distinction is made, it is only propositions that may be true or false, while beliefs are only positive or negative. But common usage jus-

tifies one in calling a belief in a true proposition a true belief, and a belief in a false proposition a false belief. Furthermore, disbelief in a true proposition would be the equivalent of a false belief, though disbelief in a false proposition might, or might not, be the equivalent of a true belief. For the purposes of the theory of knowledge, the terms "belief" and "judgment" are practically interchangeable. In the philosophy of religion, however, I prefer the term "belief," since it suggests a more permanent and stable reaction of the organism.

In the case of objects merely imagined, but believed to be real, the objects of belief are unreal, but the beliefs themselves, as psychological subject-matter, are real. So there would be a third table of real values, like the first table except for the limitation of the objects to beliefs themselves:

### III. REAL VALUES OF BELIEF

1. Immediate, or independent (when one believes, and likes to believe, just for the sake of believing, if there be such a case).
2. Instrumental, or dependent.
  - A. Conditional.
  - B. Actual.
    - a. True.
    - b. False.

These tables of values may be further elucidated through application to the chief religious objects in the higher religions. According to James's psychological study of the actual religious experiences of individuals of strongly marked religious character,<sup>16</sup> the chief objects of religious interest and belief in the higher forms of religion are the following four: (1) God, as a more or less personal being; (2) human souls as real and significant; (3) the permanent significance of the human soul, *i. e.*, personal immortality; and (4) freedom (though not, to be sure, in all forms of the higher, redemptive religions), or rather indeterminism, since the term "freedom," from its philosophical associations, means, according to James, "soft determinism,"<sup>17</sup> which is still genuine determinism even though "softened" by its idealistic setting.

God is the chief object of belief in most forms of the higher religions. Buddhism is no exception, for in actual practise Buddhism is not atheistic, the Buddha himself being deified; and in the more philosophical form of Buddhism the law of Karma, which is the moral order of the universe, would pass for a god. "Some outward real-

<sup>16</sup> See *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, and *The Will to Believe*.

<sup>17</sup> See Ch. V., "The Dilemma of Determinism," in *The Will to Believe*.

ity," James says,<sup>18</sup> "of a nature defined as God's nature must be defined, is the only ultimate object that is at the same time rational and possible for the human mind's contemplation." As to the nature of God, James says:<sup>19</sup> "It is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must be conceived under the form of mental personality. God's personality is to be regarded like any other personality, as something lying outside of my own and other than me, . . . whose existence I simply come upon and find. A power not ourselves, then, which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which recognizes us." God, regarded as a personality, is obviously desired as an end, like a human personality, and not merely as a means. In the higher religions God is actually so regarded, though no counterpart of this is discoverable in the lower, nature religions.

God would, however, if he existed, be also a means to other ends. He would guarantee the realization of the highest human ideals. First of all, he would guarantee personal immortality, which, according to James, "is one of the great spiritual needs of man."<sup>20</sup> "The difference in natural 'fact' which most of us would assign as the first difference which the existence of a God ought to make would, I imagine, be personal immortality. Religion, in fact, for the great majority of our own race *means* immortality, and nothing else. God is the producer of immortality; and whoever has doubts of immortality is written down as an atheist without further trial."<sup>21</sup>

The human soul is an object of vital concern in most forms of the redemptive religions. For example, in orthodox Christianity it is the sinful soul that needs salvation, and the Buddhist salvation from rebirth is meaningless unless there is a soul that is reincarnated, though Buddhism tries to deny the reality of the soul while still believing in reincarnation.

Although a belief in and a desire for indeterminism are not universal in the higher forms of religion, James classes indeterminism among man's "spiritual" needs. It enhances the significance of the self. The mechanical chain of events in a naturalistic scheme, which denies individual initiative, fails to satisfy, according to James, the actual desires of most persons. The "soft determinism" of monistic idealism also denies any real individual creativeness in the act of choice. For absolute idealism, "our wills are [not] ours, to make them Thine;" they are only "Thine." Pluralistic idealism

<sup>18</sup> *The Will to Believe*, pp. 115, 116.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>20</sup> *Human Immortality*, p. 2.

<sup>21</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 524.

of some sort would seem to be what the majority of the religious portion of humanity desires. There is a prominent exception, Calvinism, which denies indeterminism; but James speaks of the unsatisfactory character of Calvinistic doctrine for most religious persons, and says,<sup>22</sup> "A God who gives so little scope to love, a predestination which takes from all endeavor all its zest with all its fruit, are irrational conceptions, because they say to our most cherished powers, There is no object for you."

It now remains to classify the above-named objects of religious belief in respect to the sorts of value attaching to them. God, regarded as real, would have, first of all, an independent, or immediate, value in the higher religions. For all forms of mysticism the ultimate cosmic reality possesses immediate value. God would satisfy the believer's intellectual curiosity as to the first principle of the universe, his social desire for a great Friend above all human friends, and perhaps his esthetic interest. God would also have an instrumental, real value by guaranteeing the final attainment of the goal of man's highest endeavors. When St. Augustine prays, "I seek Thee in order that my soul may live," God is regarded by him as having instrumental value; and then, when St. Augustine speaks of God as the supreme good, the object of his belief is invested with immediate value. God, if real, would always have at least *conditional* instrumental value, being always instrumental in some direction; and would possess actual instrumental value when actually valued because judged instrumental. The judgment that mediated the valuing might be either true or false, for, though God is assumed in this classification to be real, the believer might judge him instrumental in cases where the relation of instrumentality did not hold.

It is doubtful whether the soul ever possesses immediate value, unless it is in the case of some ideal of future selfhood that one desires to realize. In such a case the "ideal" future self would be regarded as real, and hence possessing a real, immediate value, since it is assumed in this classification to be realizable sometime, while the ideal values of Table II. are assumed to be purely imaginary and never realizable. The soul, however, is more important for the instrumental value attaching to it, as a condition, *e. g.*, of immortality. Personal immortality probably never possesses immediate, real value, but is only instrumental to the rejoicing of departed friends and to the fulfilment of those purposes that death, if final, leaves incomplete. Indeterminism has only instrumental value, being a means to the desired freedom of choice. The soul, freedom, and immortality, regarded as possessing instrumental value, would

<sup>22</sup> *The Will to Believe*, p. 126.

possess only conditional value in certain cases, when actually instrumental, but not recognized as such; and actual value in other cases when actually valued because either truly or falsely judged instrumental.

So far I have assumed for the purposes of my classification that the religious objects in question are realities. If assumed to be unreal, they would be classified differently, in Table II. God, if unreal, would possess ideal, immediate value if believed in and valued directly. Being assumed unreal, God could not be actually instrumental. Hence he could never have what I have called conditional, instrumental, ideal value. He could have actual, instrumental, ideal value, however, when judged, falsely, of course, to exist, and to be instrumental to desired ends. The soul, immortality, and indeterminism would not possess immediate ideal values except in the one possible case of the soul, corresponding to the immediate real value of the soul as noted above. Of the instrumental ideal values, false, actual, instrumental values are the only ones that these objects could possess.

The determination of the reality of the objects of religious beliefs is a metaphysical problem. But it would be possible to construct, from the point of view of the outside observer of religious behavior, a philosophy of religion wholly upon the fact and the value of religious belief, without raising the metaphysical question of the existence of the objects of belief, or even if we assumed the unreality of such objects. Religion may perhaps be too good to be true. But it is a fact that there exists in many persons belief in religious objects, so I shall now classify in Table III. the real values of religious belief, regarded as a psychological, or behavioristic, object, and viewed apart from the objects of belief.

Belief could hardly possess immediate, or independent, value, except in the case where one believes in God, and likes to believe, just for the sake of believing, were there such a case. Though it is true that probably all religious believers are glad that they believe, still for most people the liking to believe in God is not a sufficient basis on which to adopt the belief. Believers normally believe in God because they think he exists; though they may as an after-thought value their belief, and pity the unbelief of others. The more significant values of religious belief, however, are instrumental values.

The most important instrumental value of belief in the higher religions is of a moral sort, even in the redemptive religions that are beyond the stage of the religions of the law. Religious belief is instrumental in many cases to higher standards of personal conduct than would otherwise be attainable. A further value is the hygienic,

or therapeutic, value of religious belief. This again is a case of belief possessing instrumental, real value. If belief in God makes one happy, and if one likes to be happy, then religious belief is a real means to this end. If, through making one happy, religious belief benefits one's health, and if one values good health, then again belief has an instrumental value. In the case of belief both as hygienic and as moral in its effect there is real instrumentality and therefore belief possesses real value in such cases—value of the conditional sort when the instrumentality is not recognized. When the instrumentality is recognized, and the belief is actually prized on that account, then the belief has true, actual, instrumental value; and a belief would have false, actual, instrumental, real value when actually valued because judged instrumental to something of which it was not actually a condition. It is chiefly through the moral and the hygienic effects of religious beliefs that they come to possess survival-value, and to be an important factor in the struggle for existence.

### III

Returning now to the pragmatic fallacy, we see that it relates chiefly to what I have called the conditional, instrumental, real value of religious belief. The survival-value of religious belief is a case of *conditional* instrumental value, except in those cases where the biological utility of belief is recognized, and where the value becomes actual as value. The valuable belief need not have a "conscious relation to biological survival," as Professor Brightman seems to think,<sup>23</sup> in order to come within the category of values. The instrumentality to a directly valued object is the essential thing. The pragmatic fallacy consists chiefly in passing from the conditional, instrumental value of a belief to the truth of the belief, and in arguing that a belief, because possessing survival-value, must, therefore, be true.

Both Professor Brightman and Professor Moore criticize what I have called the fallacy of false attribution, the fallacy of attributing the religious experience, so-called, to "higher," supernatural forces in cases where the experience is merely physiological in source—where it is from "below" and not from "above." Professor Brightman says that "it is rigorously logical to say that an event has a psycho-physiological cause, and also that the event is a divine act."<sup>24</sup> Similarly Professor Moore says:<sup>25</sup> "The alternative is not—Are these experiences subjective or objective, physiological or di-

<sup>23</sup> See *loc. cit.*, p. 72.

<sup>24</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>25</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 77, 78.

vine? . . . Rather, the question is, Are they *also* objective and spiritual?" Both would maintain, as Professor Brightman explicitly does, that every event "is a manifestation, an expression, an act of the divine," and that "Kipling's camel-'jims' were divinely caused."<sup>26</sup> The difficulty with such a view is that if every event is called divine, then the term "divine" ceases to have any meaning at all, and argument about it becomes useless. It then becomes impossible to single out a field occupied by religion. That which applies to everything elucidates nothing. Moreover, belief in the universe as explained in the naturalistic terms of scientific evolutionism is not a religious belief, and can not be made into a religious belief simply by substituting the term "God" for the term "physical universe." To explain the mystical experience, for example, as the Freudians do, in terms of sublimation of the sex instinct, is to substitute a naturalistic explanation for the religious explanation of the mystics themselves; and I submit that any religious individual would cease to regard himself as religious, and in fact cease to be religious, if he came to accept the naturalistic explanation of his so-called religious experiences.

Professor Moore admits that "the belief that God is experienced is a doctrinal *interpretation* of mystical experiences,"<sup>27</sup> not a fact, but the interpretation of that fact. He says, however, that "precisely the same thing is true of physical experiences."<sup>28</sup> But, granting this, we are confronted with the fact that the naturalistic interpretation of human experience, if accepted, contradicts the religious interpretation to the extent that, if the person having the "religious" experience gives to it a naturalistic interpretation, his former religious reading of the events becomes psychologically impossible.

Criticism of the pragmatic fallacy and the fallacy of false attribution that would undermine them must first meet them on their own ground. As I originally defined them, and as I still maintain them, they stand as genuine and frequently encountered fallacies in the logic of religion.

WESLEY RAYMOND WELLS.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.

<sup>26</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>27</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 78.

<sup>28</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 78.